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Focusing on food (in)security, this paper argues that the Covid-19 pandemic has shed light on what has been so
far neglected in the on-going Brexit discussions. The current pandemic has produced startling images of empty
supermarket shelves, shortages of farm workers, increased use of food banks and heightened concern over the
health of those at the lower end of the socio-economic scale. We argue that food insecurity was not created by the
current pandemic but is a serious underlying issue in the UK, which has not been adequately considered in
discussions about Brexit. In other words, the pandemic has simply highlighted the risk that Brexit will worsen
food insecurity and the health of those already disadvantaged. We argue that the pandemic provides an oppor-
tunity for UK policy makers to consider the impact of food trade deals on food insecurity, one which we urge them
to take.1. Introduction
The purpose of this commentary article is to examine food (in)secu-
rity in the UK in light of the Covid-19 pandemic but also crucially, in light
of the government’s insistence on leaving the European Union (EU) at the
end of 2020, with or without a deal, and the impact that might have. The
early weeks of the pandemic, and the ensuing lockdown, revealed scenes
of empty supermarket shelves; panic buying; many families and vulner-
able groups struggling to access food; and farmers unable to find enough
workers to pick fruit and vegetables. Even more worrying, the pandemic
exposed a number of the fragilities and inequalities in the UK food system
in relation to food security. From an overreliance on a ‘just-in-time’ food
distribution model and poorly paid migrant and transitory food labour
force to rising levels of malnutrition and use of food banks; it is important
to note that much of what had been exposed predates the pandemic. The
pandemic simply highlighted issues that have not been properly
addressed by successive UK governments over the past decade. Below we
list some of these food security issues and discuss them in relation to the
Covid-19 pandemic and Brexit. Our main concern is that the food (in)
security problems the UK is facing, and which have been exposed by the
pandemic, may be further exacerbated by the UK’s decision to leave the
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food security
The problems that have been exposed by the pandemic are varied and
multifaceted. For the purpose of this commentary article we will focus on
two specific areas, household food insecurity and structural issues
affecting how food is grown, produced and imported. Household food
insecurity, and in particular child food insecurity, has become a major
news story during the pandemic. This is because of the dramatic increase
in the use of food banks and food charities (see, for example, Fairshare,
2020; Loopstra, 2020; and The Trussell Trust, 2020) and the campaign
led by the footballer Marcus Rashford to provide free school meals for
eligible children during holiday periods (Richardson, 2020). There is no
doubt that household food insecurity has risen during the pandemic.
What is perhaps less well recognised is that it has increased from an
already high baseline. Food insecurity, defined as ‘a household-level
economic and social condition of limited or uncertain access to
adequate food’ (The Trussell Trust, 2019), was estimated to affect 8–10%
of UK households between 2016 and 2018 (Institute of Health Equity,
2010). In its July 2018 report, the UK Stakeholders for Sustainable
Development stated that the government ‘is failing to address malnutri-
tion in all forms, with food insecurity and obesity rising’ and that the
‘level of adult food insecurity in the UK is among the worst in Europe, andston.ac.uk (H. Mulrooney).
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(UKSSD, 2018). Food insecurity adversely affects both mental and
physical health, with impacts in the short and long-term (Gundersen &
Ziliak, 2015; End Hunger, 2019). Young mothers, the unemployed and
those on low incomes are more likely to be food insecure, and women
more so than men (Institute of Health Equity, 2010).
Food insecurity, poverty, hunger and obesity are all linked through
shared causal pathways (House of Commons Environmental Audit
Committee, 2019). During the pandemic more people were pushed into
food insecurity, with heightened risks of obesity and malnutrition
particularly among deprived communities (Food Standard Agency,
2020). This is a cause for concern because people living in deprived
areas, particularly those with underlying health conditions, have had
higher rates of infection and death from Covid-19 (Public Health En-
gland, 2020). Poor diet is a well-recognised contributor to ill health.
Recent statistics on dietary intakes paint a stark picture: those who are
more deprived are already least likely to eat a nutritious diet (Public
Health England, 2019; The Food Foundation, 2016). According to the
World Health Organisation (WHO), poor diet is one of four major
modifiable risk factors for diseases such as cardiovascular disease, cancer
and type 2 diabetes (World Health Organisation, 2018). These diseases
are socially patterned; with greater prevalence in more compared with
less deprived groups (The King’s Fund, 2018), and a greater proportion of
people from Black, Asian and minority ethnic (BAME) backgrounds are
deprived (ONS, 2018a). Similarly, recent analyses by Public Health En-
gland (2020) suggest that BAME groups are more likely to be seriously
affected by Covid-19, not because they have greater genetic susceptibility
to the virus, but because of their socio-economic conditions. They are
more likely to work in places where they are more exposed to infection,
to have lower wages, which makes it difficult for them to stop working,
and low paid workers are more likely to live in crowded conditions
making transmission of the virus easier. They are also more likely to
suffer from chronic diseases such as obesity and diabetes, making them
more vulnerable to the serious complications of Covid-19. Thus social
and nutritional inequality within the UK, well known with regard to risk
of chronic diseases, is further exposed by an infectious disease pandemic.
The pandemic has also highlighted several structural weaknesses with
regard to the UK’s food system which affect food security, in particular
the reliance on the ‘just-in-time’ (JiT) model and on a migrant and sea-
sonal low skilled food labour force. The JiT model has transformed
British supermarkets, resulting in lower food costs and greater choice for
consumers (Holmes, 2020). It has also meant low levels of UK food
stocks, estimated to be around ‘three to five days’ worth (Lang, 2016);
though it is important to note that, according to DEFRA, stocks of
different food groups vary, from several weeks for certain dry goods to
24 h in the case of some fresh produce (Lang, 2019). The early stages of
the pandemic, which saw empty supermarket shelves and panic buying,
stoked fears of food shortages, albeit temporarily. Panic buying in
particular exposed wide spread insecurity about food stocks even among
those who would not consider themselves food insecure. This suggests
that the JiT model relies on the public’s confidence regarding the
robustness of the system. In addition, the pandemic further highlighted
concerns with regard to the UK’s food labour force, exposing the reliance
on low paid migrant workers. In order to meet the demands for food
labour during the pandemic the government had to waive restriction
requirements and fly in workers from Romanian and Bulgaria (O’Carroll,
2020a). It also set up a national campaign to recruit British workers, with
minimal success; of 35,000 expressions of interest, only 5500 chose to go
for an interview (Reynolds, 2020).
3. How does this relate to Brexit?
We argue that the problems highlighted by the pandemic with rela-
tion to food insecurity will potentially be further exacerbated by the UK’s
withdrawal from the EU, and while the effects of the pandemic may be
short-term, those of Brexit may be more long-lasting. This will be the case2
regardless of whether the UK withdraws with a deal or not, though it is
clear that a no-deal scenario would make matters worse. We base our
argument on a number of factors, but for the sake of brevity we will focus
on four below.
First, Brexit, in whatever shape or form, will result in greater
disruption to trade between the UK and the EU, which will impact on the
JiT model. During the pandemic, supermarkets generally managed the
panic buying and early shock well, but there were problems with getting
the right supplies to where they were needed, and the whole episode
raised questions about the resilience of the UK food supply and distri-
bution networks, particularly post-Brexit (Garnett et al., 2020; Holmes,
2020). These fears reflect the UK’s reliance on food imports and its need
for frictionless access to Europe. The UK’s food sufficiency rate is around
60%, with 40% of food consumed brought in from elsewhere, the over-
whelming majority from and through the EU (Lang, 2020). A recent
French trial of new border control measures, which resulted in long de-
lays, highlighted the potential consequences of trade that was not fric-
tionless (O’Carroll, 2020b). According to the Office of Budgetary
Responsibility (OBR), border disruption, affecting trade from the EU, is
expected to last for up to a year, with the greatest disruption in the first
quarter of 2021, even in the case of a trade deal. The OBR also projects
that this will be accompanied by extensive disruption to the agriculture
sector in the UK, which will be the worst sector affected by Brexit, placing
further constraints on the JiT model (OBR, 2020).
It is hard to predict how UK food retailers will manage the Brexit
disruption to their food supply chains. UK supermarkets managed to
ensure that shelves remained relatively stocked during the height of the
pandemic lockdown. Interestingly, it has been suggested that the resil-
ience shown by the sector was due to the preparations made for a no-deal
Brexit (Peterson, 2020). What is clear is that Brexit will cause disruptions
to trade between the UK and the EU and to the agriculture sector in the
UK, which will necessitate a rethinking of the current JiT model (Garnett
et al., 2020; Holmes, 2020). A disruption to the JiT model as a result of
Brexit would disproportionally impact those at the lower end of the
socio-economic scale (Lang, 2019). As we have witnessed with the
pandemic, this may also affect the food security of many, including those
who had previously thought of themselves as food secure.
Second, some of the issues concerning the JiT model could be miti-
gated if the UK increased its own food production. However, the Covid-
19 pandemic has demonstrated a key weakness in UK food labour supply,
which will be further exacerbated by the loss of EUworkers. The problem
of recruiting sufficient food labour is complicated by uncertainty over
what will happen once the free movement of workers from the EU ceases.
If stricter immigration controls prioritise highly skilled workers, but not
seasonal workers from Bulgaria and Romania, where will the necessary
food labour come from? It has also become clear that treating seasonal
and experienced farm workers as low skilled and poorly paid labour is
counterproductive to recruitingmore UK based workers (Jones, 2020). In
the run up to Brexit, Industry heads have called on the government to
either extend current schemes to recruit food labour from outside the UK
or ‘face price hikes and shortages’ (Sandercock, 2020).
Third, the current UK-EU transitional agreement is due to end on
December 31, 2020. It is not yet clear at this stage whether the UK will
leave with a deal, and as a result most of the models estimating the
possible impact of Brexit on food prices have looked at both possibilities.
While there is a degree of variation between the models used, they all
suggest that food prices are likely to rise after Brexit regardless of
whether a UK-EU deal is agreed; the models are clear that food price rises
will be higher under a no-deal scenario. This is because, in the absence of
an agreement, UK-EU trade will be based on World Trade Organisation
rules and will involve the application of tariffs and non-tariffs barriers.
The variations between models are to an extent a product of the high
degree of uncertainty regarding the negotiations and the impact of a
number of different factors, for example: the type of food product ana-
lysed; the exact levels of tariffs and non-tariff barriers; the level of sup-
port given by the UK to domestic food production; the impact of future
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consumers by retailers. Potential Brexit food price rises have been
modelled to be as low as 2–3% (Hubbard, 2019) and as high as 6% and
22%, in the case of a deal and a no-deal scenario respectively (Barons &
Aspinall, 2020). A recent analysis by the LSE indicates that price rises for
branded and specialty food products would likely be 9.9% in a deal
scenario and 26.5% in a no deal scenario; and for unbranded and more
substitutable products 4.7% in deal and 12.5% in no deal scenarios (Datta
et al., 2020). What is clear is that the likely effect of Brexit, regardless of
the shape and form it takes, will be a rise in food prices. As we will
explain below, household food insecurity is not simply about food prices.
Nevertheless, it is clear that rising food prices will increase household
food insecurity and have direct implications for healthcare, particularly
those with chronic conditions (Barons & Aspinall, 2020).
Lastly, it is becoming clearer that regardless of its specific shape or
form, Brexit will result in higher unemployment and lower economic
growth, at least in the short term, with the agriculture sector particularly
badly hit (OBR, 2020). Analysis on behalf of UK in a Changing Europe
suggests that Brexit, both with regard to deal and no-deal scenarios,
might have a longer negative impact on the economy than the pandemic
(Simpson, 2020). It is hard to predict what the long term implications of
lower economic growth, higher unemployment and greater economic
uncertainty will be for the UK, and whether they will result in higher
taxes and or lower public spending. What we can say with a high degree
of certainty is that, if the OBR predictions are accurate, Brexit-resultant
lower growth and higher unemployment will adversely affect the food
security of those who are currently struggling and or those living in
deprived areas. It might also push more people into poverty and food
insecurity. This will translate into greater household food insecurity in
the UK and further rises in the use of food banks and free school meals.
4. Brexit and the UK’s food security problem
We fully acknowledge that Brexit was never promoted as a solution to
the UK’s food security problems. ‘Taking back control’ was the main
slogan, and it clearly resonated with much of the British electorate, but it
is not clear what this means in term of food policy generally speaking and
with regard to food security specifically. Nevertheless, those advocating
for Brexit argued that it would enable the UK to better address many of
the food problems it faced. In that sense, the pandemic has provided a
reality check of what the real food issues are and what the implications
for food security are of not addressing them properly.
In many ways food insecurity will be exacerbated not only by the
direct and indirect impacts of Brexit, but also by the fact that there was
never a clear Brexit food policy and that what was discussed did not try to
address the real food insecurity problems. The pro-Brexit campaign, and
later the Conservative government, identified low productivity, over-
bearing EU bureaucracy and food prices as key food issues that needed to
be addressed (Ranta, 2019). They asserted that EU food policies, in
particular the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and Common Fisheries
Policy (CFP), were financially wasteful and inefficient; overly regulated
to the point of suffocating food producers and economically disadvan-
tageous to consumers; unhelpful to UK farmers and fishermen; ruinous to
the environment; artificially inflate food prices; and that they reduced
competition and choice for UK consumers. Leaving the EUwould, in their
view, bring about new free trade agreements (FTAs) with non-EU food
producers, such as the US, Canada, and Australia; reduce crippling food
regulations and rules; reduce food prices; and allow UK food producers to
innovate and raise productivity (Vote Leave, n.d). These ideas by and
large underpin Conservative governments’ approaches to food after the
referendum (Ranta, 2019). Setting aside for the moment whether these
ideas put together represent a clear and coherent long term policy di-
rection for food security in the UK, they raise two important questions.
First, has the UK government correctly diagnosed the UK food system’s
problems, particularly with regard to food security? Second, are the
Brexit-related remedies it is proposing suitable in addressing the food3
security problems the UK is facing?
In our view Brexit-inspired Conservative governments have mis-
diagnosed the problems that affect food policy, and in particular food
security. Over the past decade, and despite record levels of employment,
the UKwitnessed rising levels of food insecurity, including increasing use
of food banks (Garthwaite, 2016). Many of the contributing factors, such
as the rising levels of inequality and changes to the benefit system, are
national rather than related to the EU. Food insecurity in the UK is not
primarily about food prices (although this is an important factor), pro-
ductivity or EU regulations and regulatory bodies. Instead of focusing on
the problem of access to adequate and nutritious food, the government
appears focused on the issues of choice, deregulation and productivity.
Because it has misdiagnosed the problem, the remedies the government
has proposed will not alleviate food insecurity in the UK; if anything they
could make things worse.
Let us start with the proposal of pursuing FTAs with leading food
exporting countries. The EU is a major source of food for the UK. An
estimated 30% of food, 40% of vegetables and 37% of fruit consumed in
the UK is imported from the EU (End Hunger, 2019; House of Lords
European Union Committee, 2018). It is unclear how the UK government
proposes to bridge this gap if an agreement cannot be reached with the
EU. Any such agreement will require a UK commitment to EU food
standards, which will directly affect FTAs with other countries. We
accept the argument that negotiating FTAs outside of the EU may well
open up the UK food market to cheaper food imports, but this will almost
certainly mean accepting lower food standards (Future British Standards
Coalition, 2020). While the government has made a commitment that
food standards will be maintained and the UK population will not have to
accept lower food or hygiene standards (Askew, 2020), this would make
it harder to negotiate FTAs. Recently, the government rejected a House of
Lords amendment that would have required imported foods to meet UK
standards (BBC, 2020). What is far more likely to happen is that the UK
will slowly move towards accepting lower food and hygiene standards
while continuing to support high UK standards; in other words the cre-
ation of a two-tier food system (Benton et al., 2019). Such a systemwould
ensure British food was produced to high standards while allowing
cheaper imports that were not, potentially driving UK producers out of
business (Millstone et al., 2019). This in our view would be a disastrous
policy if pursued by the government, forcing British farmers to compete
with cheaper and less regulated imports, while allowing ‘cheap’ food, of
lower nutritional standards and with higher risk, into the UK market.
The second issue that Brexit campaigners focused on is food prices
(Ranta, 2019). This is interesting particularly given that pre-pandemic,
UK household spending on food was only around 8% of their budget
(excluding eating out), one of the lowest figures in the world (ONS,
2018b). Access to food is an increasingly important issue in the UK, but it
is not simply about the price of food. Disparities in intake of nutritious
foods, as well as the prevalence of non-communicable diseases including
obesity, can be seen across different socioeconomic groups (Foster et al.,
2018; PHE, 2019). Successive governments have tried to address this
through different policies. Most recently the Obesity Strategy has sought
(among other actions) to reduce the promotion of unhealthy foods (high
in fat, salt & sugar), both online and in physical locations, especially to
children (DHSC, 2020). The possibility that lower quality food products
enter the UK as a consequence of Brexit is incompatible with the public
health work which has been carried out for the past years (PHE, 2017),
and incompatible with the aim of the current Obesity Strategy (DHSC,
2020). Given that an important aspect of food security is access to ‘suf-
ficient, safe & nutritious food’ (FAO, 2003), the potential flooding of the
UK food market with cheaper, less safe and less nutritionally valuable
food would increase food insecurity. And this is not simply in relation to a
potential FTA with the US, which according to the government’s own
analysis will be worth much less than initially predicted (Department for
International Trade, 2020); the incoming President Joe Biden has sug-
gested the US was in no hurry to sign new FTAs (Friedman, 2020). The
main food-exporting countries the government has proposed negotiating
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not seeking the lowering of tariffs, which are already low, but greater
access. This implies some UK acceptance of their regulations, labelling
and standards, which currently include practices that are either restricted
or banned in the EU (Ranta, 2019; Future British Standards Coalition,
2020). Whatever the underlying causes, those with insecure access to
food should not be made to take risks with the foods they choose, and
those on low incomes are more likely to choose high calorie less nutri-
tious foods (Whybrow et al., 2017).
Lastly, what about CAP and CFP? Will leaving those frameworks
improve prospects for food security, and for farmers and fishermen?
Analyses suggest that being freed of the yokes of CAP and CFP would in
fact make the farmers and fishermen poorer for a long time (Taylor,
2017). While the UK government has never been a very keen supporter of
CAP, UK farmers received £3 billion annually under the policy to sustain
their farming. It is estimated about 50–60 per cent of an average UK
farm’s income comprises a subsidy under CAP. This varies across the UK:
in Northern Ireland about 80 per cent of farmers income in is CAP subsidy
(House of Lords European Union Committee, 2017). Since Northern
Ireland is the poorest nation in the UK, we can see the same pattern here:
Brexit is likely to hit the poorest hardest. As for the CFP, the problem
would not be the loss of subsidies which would hit the fishermen but the
need to put in place an alternative governance structure, which respects
the interests of non-industry stakeholders, the competencies of the UK
devolved governments and the UN convention on the Law of the Sea
(McAngus et al., 2018), as well as a new trade agreement with the biggest
buyer of UK fish and the biggest fish and sea food market in the world,
the EU (Billiet, 2019).
5. Conclusion
The current Covid-19 pandemic has exposed the emptiness behind
the Brexit slogans of taking back control, reducing food prices and
providing choice. As we have outlined above, Brexit was never meant to
address food security issues, with its focus instead on FTAs, deregulation
and cheap imports. As we have shown, these do not, and will not provide
an adequate remedy to the food security problems the UK is facing, which
have only been exacerbated by the pandemic, and they may end up
making the situation worse.
The increased use of free school meals and food banks over the past
decade and during the pandemic has exposed the structural inequalities
that are at the heart of food insecurity in the UK, among the worst in
Europe. The food security problems the UK is facing, and which were
highlighted by the pandemic, such as inadequate access to sufficient and
nutritious food, hunger, malnutrition and obesity are the end result of
long-term problems exacerbated by a decade of austerity and insufficient
support for vulnerable groups. The Brexit remedy will create an even less
secure food environment in the UK and will probably force many
vulnerable groups to subsist on cheaper and less safe and nutritious
foods. Even in the case of a Brexit deal with the EU, the increase in food
prices and the lower economic growth which are predicted by all models,
coupled with questions over food labour and the resilience of the JiT food
distribution model, have the potential to exacerbate food insecurity in
the UK and for the most vulnerable citizens.
Lastly, in our view, any future trade deals should be independently
scrutinised for their potential impact on food insecurity. Poor diet is a
major modifiable risk factor for chronic diseases, which have been major
causes of death and disability in the UK for many years, and are socially
patterned. Hasty food compromises may inadvertently increase food
insecurity and we may not see the effects of this on chronic disease for
many decades. The price for failing to tackle food insecurity or
compromising over it in the pursuit of FTAs will be borne by the most
vulnerable in society. The pandemic has provided us with a chance to
rectify and alleviate food insecurity; it should be a rallying cry.4
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